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Abstract 
 
The efforts to stabilize the Moldovan economy after the crisis of 1998 have been 
largely successful. The country avoided international default as current account position 
radically improved, cooperation with international financial institutions was re-established 
and a significant primary fiscal surplus was achieved. As a result, the exchange rate was 
stabilised and inflation substantially reduced. Moreover, several important structural reforms 
were implemented and privatisation of key-industries pursued with much more 
determination than previously. However, only economic growth would bring real solutions to 
the persistent problems of external and internal imbalances of the Moldovan economy and 
would allow the country to face its heavy debt burden in the future. Unfortunately, prospects 
for sustainable growth remain weak, as the most important issues that constrain private 
entrepreneurship and investments have not been effectively tackled. These issues include: 
lack of territorial integrity, ineffective legal system, widespread corruption and rent seeking. 
It is unlikely that these problems can be solved until the Moldovan parliament assumes full 
ownership of reform process. 
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Introduction: Economic crisis in Moldova 
 
Moldova underwent a major financial crisis that followed promptly after the outbreak of the 
Russian Crisis in August 19981. Capital flight brought the country to the verge of default, as collapse 
of the exchange rate put an end of the fragile monetary stabilisation and increased abruptly the debt 
burden, while the real sector was severely affected by the rapid loss of CIS export markets. However, 
the financial crisis should be seen in the perspective of the proceeding period of a 8-year-long decline 
in GDP and it cannot be truly overcome without changing fundamental characteristics of the 
economy.  
 
Table 1. Moldova – basic economic indicators 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Real GDP growth rate -1.2% -30.9% -1.4% -5.9% 1.6% -6.5% -4.4%
Annual inflation rate 
(end of  period) 2707.2% 104.6% 23.8% 15.1% 11.1% 18.2% 43.8%
Exchange rate, 
lei/1USD (end of year) 3.64 4.27 4.50 4.65 4.66 8.32 11.59
Source: Moldovan Economic Trends 
 
Although the determinants of growth and the causes of financial crises belong to the most 
hotly discussed and controversial issues in the economic literature, economic developments in 
Moldova are relatively simple to explain2. While the initial decline of GDP was related mainly to 
disintegration of Soviet economic system, very negative changes in the terms of trade (mainly 
increase of energy prices) and civil war, the prolonged decline was clearly a result of bad policies. 
The stop-and-go approach to reforms, the development of powerful vested interest groups and 
political instability prevented the creation of the functioning market economy conducive to growth of 
private entrepreneurship and investments. Wrong microeconomic incentives, resulting from 
neglecting structural reforms, proliferation of non-payment culture and corruption, contributed to the 
slow pace of enterprise restructuring, lack of market orientation, scarcity of new market entries, low 
level of investments and waste of recourses in non-productive or even value-detracting activities. In 
this situation, sustainable growth simply could not take place3. 
 Microeconomic distortions also had an impact on the macroeconomic policies that clearly 
were on an unsustainable path. Tight monetary policy was in striking contrast with unsustainable 
fiscal policy that was driven by the inertia of spending commitments on the expenditure side and by 
the inability to raise tax revenues on the income side. High deficits led to excessive absorption in the 
economy that was not met by the supply side response due to the impeded restructuring process. It 
fuelled imports and the trade balance steadily deteriorated. Particularly, inefficiencies in the energy 
sector led to the wastage of imported energy resources. At the same time, capital inflows necessary to 
finance the budget deficit, combined with domestic restrictive monetary policy, prevented the 
depreciation of the currency. The ultimate result of the policy mix was the rapid accumulation of 
                                                 
1 The authors want to thank Christopher Mallmann, Apostolos Papaphilippou and  Constantin Zaman for 
comments. All remaining errors are ours. 
2 See Radziwill et al. (1999) for detailed discussion of fundamental causes of 1998 financial crises in Moldova. 
3 See: Castanhera and Popov (2000), Guriev and Ickes (2000), Filer et al. (2000), Campos and Coricelli (2000) 
for discussion of determinants of growth in transition economies. 
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external debt and expenditure arrears. The unsustainability of both internal and external position of 
the state led to the inevitable financial crisis. The turmoil in financial markets that followed the 
Russian crisis in 1988 was therefore only a trigger that brought the inevitable collapse of the fragile 
monetary stabilisation.  
This paper analyses the quality of post-crisis adjustments with respect to these developments, 
and discusses whether they may warrant sustainable growth and therefore overcome fundamental 
causes of the crisis. The remainder of this paper is organised in the following way. Chapter 1 
describes the frantic efforts to stabilise the economic situation immediately after the crisis. It 
concludes that while these efforts were largely successful, much more fundamental reforms are 
necessary in order to truly overcome the economic crisis. Accordingly, Chapter 2 gives 
recommendations for such reforms and chapter 3 evaluates actual post-crisis structural policies. 
Chapter 4 discusses chances for sustainable growth in the medium perspective and concludes. 
 
1. Struggle for short-term stability 1999-2000 
 
Although the economic crisis had fundamental and structural causes, the most immediate 
post-crisis actions involved a struggle to achieve short-term macroeconomic stability. The situation 
was especially fragile in 1999 while some breathing space for policies was already achieved in 
2000. 
 
1.1. Achieving external sustainability 
 
The immediate cause for the financial crisis in Moldova was the rapid deterioration in the 
balance of payment after the outbreak of Russian crisis in August 1998. While the current account 
imbalances between 1995 and 1997 were coupled with surging capital inflow, both current account 
and capital account were negatively affected in the second half of 1998. As a consequence of the 
Russian crisis, Moldova experienced a deep plunge in exports and as other countries in the region – 
a dramatic outflow of private financing. Moldova did not have a program with the IMF since 
beginning of 1998, so the situation was further aggravated due to the negative financing from 
international financial institutions in this year. This dramatic situation and the unsuccessful attempts 
to maintain the exchange rate led to the substantial loss of international reserves and the increase in 
external arrears. These tendencies could not be continued in 1999. Accordingly, improvements in 
the balance of payment were the most important and visible signs of adjustments in the year 
following the crisis. While adjustments in the current account was spontaneous and did not require 
the active role of the government – apart from the delayed decision of NBM to float the exchange 
rate in November 1998 - the government attempts to prevent the collapse of capital account deserve 
some credit. 
.  
Improvement of current account balance 
 
The main result of the initial real depreciation of the domestic currency was a sharp reduction 
of imports leading to a very substantial improvement of the current account. This effect was further 
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strengthened by an increase in transfers (mainly humanitarian aid). As a result current account was 
reduced to the sustainable level of 2% of GDP4. 
 
Table 2. Current account as % of GDP 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-8.0 -11.1 -14.2 -19.0 -2.0 -7.3
Source: IMF, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model5. 
 
In the year 2000, this adjustment has been somehow reversed as imports surged again due to a 
moderate nominal and significant real appreciation of the domestic currency. However remittances 
from Moldovans working abroad and transfers noted unusual highs in 2000, so the impact on the 
current account was less substantial. 
 
Figure 1. Elements of current account, USD mln 
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Source: IMF, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
Fragile capital account 
While the situation in the current account improved substantially in 1999, the capital account 
was subject to further deterioration, as capital continued to flow out of the country. This tendency, 
however, has been partly offset by two achievements of the government. First, the agreement with 
the IMF allowed for non-negative net financing from this organisation in 1999 and even more 
importantly paved the way to significant disbursements from other official creditors. Secondly the 
Moldovan authorities arranged successfully the buy-back operation of 130 mln USD debt to Russia, 
that allowed to reduce the debt and debt service significantly6. In 2000, the government generated 
                                                 
4 See: Jarociński (2000) for detailed analysis of current account adjustments in 1999. 
5 The macroeconomic model has been developed in the framework of GTZ project “Medium Tem Financial 
Planning” with the participation of subcontracted CASE experts. 
6 In the balance of payment this operation has been shown as capital transfers of USD 115 mln and debt 
repayment of 130 mln USD. 
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significant capital account surplus, in spite of lack of a program with the IMF through the ambitious 
program of privatisation that together with raising capital standards for the banking system 
contributed to the rise in the FDIs. Last but not least, due to a general macroeconomic stabilisation, 
capital flight has been stopped. 
Figure 2. Elements of capital account, net USD mln7 
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Source: IMF, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
Reserves and arrears 
As a result of these actions the overall balance of payment8 improved significantly in 1999 and 
further on in 2000. In 1998, the substantial overall deficit aggravated by payments to IMF forced 
the sale of a substantial part of foreign reserves (220 mln) and the accumulation of new arrears (140 
mln). In 1999 reserves actually increased by 40 mln USD, although arrears increased further (by 
more than 120 mln USD). Although the Russian energy suppliers implicitly accepted the increase in 
arrears, it posed an extreme risk to Moldovan economy, as the country was experiencing temporary 
cut-offs in energy supplies. In 2000 the overall balance was actually positive, which forced NBM to 
buy dollars (40 mln USD) in order to avoid excessive appreciation of domestic currency and 
allowed for some reduction of external arrears.  
 Figure 3. Overall balance of payment, USD mln9 
                                                 
7 Some 90 mln USD shown in the diagram, as short-term investment in 2000 is just a result of converting arrears 
towards Gazprom into government bonds – reported as negative exceptional financing below the line. 
8 Overall balance of payment, as defined here, excludes adjustments in international reserves of national bank, 
changes in net position against IMF and exceptional financing through restructuring and changes in arrears (items shown 
“below the line” in the analytical form of balance of payment).  
9 See the footnote no. 5 and no. 6. If energy debt conversion of 90 mln USD is excluded, overall balance of 
payment is ca. 50 mln USD in 2000. 
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Source: IMF, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
In general, while government policies should be praised for preventing further capital account 
deterioration in the years 1999 and 2000, the re-emergence of a large trade balance deficit in 2000 
calls for attention, as it might contribute to the repetition of the crisis in the future. This 
consideration is especially important as imports fuel mainly private consumption and therefore do 
not build up export potential of the Moldovan economy, while FDIs may be much lower if the 
privatisation slows down in the future. 
Figure 4. Structure of GDP, % 
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Source: Department of Statistics, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
 
1.2. Debt trap and fiscal consolidation 
 
Capital flight in 1998 had major consequences for fiscal policy. The unfavourable situation in 
international financial markets, which preceded the Russian crisis, made external debt financing of 
the deficit impossible. Also domestic commercial banks were not willing to provide liquidity to the 
state budget. As the revenue side of the budget was below expectations, the government had no 
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choice but to introduce a series of ad- hoc expenditure cuts throughout 1998. However, the problem 
of servicing the internal debt could not be solved this way. In this situation, NBM was forced to 
extend direct credits to the Ministry of Finance. Such a policy could not be continued, however, as 
it would lead directly to hyperinflation. Instead, the government had to undertake a dramatic 
adjustment of its fiscal policy. This adjustment had to be even harsher, as the external indebtedness 
of GDP almost doubled between 1997 and 1998, due to the depreciation of the domestic currency.  
Figure 5. Direct government debt10 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
Accordingly, all external interest and amortisation payments that the government needed to 
make required more domestic resources and other expenditures had to be squeezed substantially (or 
revenues increased) in order to achieve a substantial primary surplus.  
However, tax revenues remained very week in 1999, partly because of crisis, partly because 
of changing structure of GDP (less consumption and imports implying less revenues from VAT, 
excise and duties) and partly because of a reduction of non-cash payments. Therefore, almost all the 
adjustment had to be achieved through the reduction of expenditures. Expenditures cuts initially 
were of an ad-hoc nature and therefore of rather low efficiency. Only later on, some more planned 
expenditure rationalisation started to be introduced and more systematic attempts were made to 
increase tax collections11. One of marked achievements of these policies was the constraint in the 
accumulation of arrears. 
Figure 6. Government interest payments 
                                                 
10 Additionally, private external loans guaranteed by the government and debts of energy enterprises (implicit 
liability of state of Moldova, at times being partly converted into explicit government debt) constitute some 7% and 26% 
of GD, respectively, at the end of 2000.  If these items are added the total government debt increases to 135% of GDP. 
11 The structural reforms in fiscal sphere are discussed in the chapter 3. 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
 
Figure 7. Elements of budget deficit, % of GDP 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
revenues expenditures cash balance
accrual balance primary accrual balance
 Source: Ministry of Finance, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
 
Although a primary (accrual) surplus has been achieved, the acute problem of cash deficit 
financing remained, as a further increase in external debt was not possible, financial capacities of 
commercial banks were very weak and the constraint on direct credit from National Bank of 
Moldova was necessary for containing inflation. There was only one option available and 
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accordingly, the government with unprecedented  determination launched a cash privatisation 
process12.  
Figure 8. Financing of budget deficit, % of GDP 
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1.3. Disinflation and exchange rate stabilisation 
 
The balance of payment crisis exerted a strong pressure on the national currency. Initially, 
NBM tried to maintain the exchange rate through substantial interventions on the foreign exchange 
market. In a few months between August and November, NBM reserves were depleted to their 1994 
level, while depreciation pressures did not subside. Finally, in November 1998 NBM stopped 
interventions and allowed commercial banks to freely determine the exchange rate. Since that 
moment, the official exchange rate has been set as a weighted average of rates in interbank 
transactions. Depreciation of the currency put strong pressure on prices through the increase in 
import prices, restrained only by higher domestic supply to domestic markets due to abrupt loss in 
export possibilities to CIS markets. As NBM extended a direct credit to the government, the growth 
of money supply brought a surge in inflation in the fourth quarter of 1998 and at the beginning of 
1999. Finally, the declining demand for real money balances was the obvious result of a loss of 
confidence in the national currency and accordingly increasing velocity of money added another 
cause for increasing inflation. While the exchange rate depreciated from 4,7 in the middle of 1998 
to 8.3 in the end of 1998 and 11.6 in the end of 1999 NBM managed to constrain inflation to 40% 
annual average, and to 43% end of period in this year. That allowed for real depreciation of the 
currency that contributed in turn to the adjustments in trade balance.  
Figure 9. Inflation and depreciation: QoQ 
                                                 
12 Note that the high revenues from privatisation in 1997 were a result of sales of military equipment (21 air 
fighters). 
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In 2000 the situation has been reversed. The increase of capital inflows led to a stable 
exchange rate (even in nominal terms), while a relatively large increase in the monetary stock, 
delayed effects of depreciation and the increase in prices of energy and food (results of drought) 
maintained relatively high inflation (ca. 30% on average and just below 20% end of period). This 
led to another real appreciation and the deterioration in the trade balance. The rapid increase in 
monetization in year 2000 and gradual fall in interest demanded on treasury bills shows however, 
that financial institutions appreciated the stabilisation policy of the Moldovan authorities. 
 
1.4. Summary 
 
The currency crisis in Moldova that of the second half of 1998 forced rapid macroeconomic 
adjustments that took place in 1999. Lack of foreign financing reduced the current account deficit 
substantially, similarly the budget deficit had to be decreased, as nobody was willing to finance 
unviable budgetary expenses. After a sharp depreciation the exchange rate is stable and inflation, 
although still high, is subsiding. Macroeconomic stability is however still fragile and prospects for 
growth weak. Accordingly, the following chapter presents some main directions for economic 
policies that should establish  the basis for long lasting stability and growth.  
 
2. Strategy for growth and long run stability 
 
Internal and external imbalances in the Moldovan economy that led directly to the crisis will 
not be removed unless there are development dynamics in production that may satisfy expectations of 
Moldovan consumers. Unless sustainable economic growth is achieved, the aggregated demand is 
reflected either in current account deficit or inflationary pressures. Real economic growth is also 
essential for human development and reduction of poverty. Accordingly this chapter provides the 
general strategy for generating economic growth in Moldova.  
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2.1. Major impediments to growth 
 
Various answers are offered to the question of causes for depths and length of economic 
decline in Moldova. Sometimes it is argued that promoting more domestic demand for Moldovan 
products is necessary for stimulating the growth of production, either through the increase in incomes 
(more government transfers?) or through import substitution (protection of domestic producers?). 
Sometimes the lack of profitability of Moldovan firms and an excessive tax burden are underlined 
(more subsidies? less taxes?). Finally, market allocations are described as inefficient and not allowing 
for investments in the most productive sectors (more state intervention?). The analysis of the 
economic developments in Moldova before the 1998 crisis gives allows an assessment of some of 
these claims. Relatively high domestic demand before 1998 resulted in a growing trade deficit rather 
than the increase in production, subsidies and lax fiscal policy contributed to the lack of restructuring 
while attempts to encourage investments through state credit guarantees inevitably led to failures of 
the supported projects and accumulation of bad debts. Finally, a very significant depreciation of the 
currency after the Russian crisis did not lead to any significant export growth or major import 
substitution. 
It is argued here that the fundamental weakness of the economic reforms in Moldova was the 
failure to create a economic situation in which the supply side responds to market demand.  This is 
essential as there is a substantial potential demand for Moldovan products. Most importantly there are 
very large export possibilities and the country could and should have developed rapidly its export 
sector, while building on its well-known comparative advantage (cheap and well qualified labour, 
fertile soils, climate). Because of the small size of the Moldovan economy in comparison to 
international (and also national) markets, such expansion would not even require the acquisition of 
large market shares. Yet, there are barely any signs of such an expansion. Although export 
orientation is far more promising, Moldovan producers should also serve domestic markets more 
effectively. Still, at the present moment domestic markets are highly penetrated by foreign products 
even in sectors in which Moldovan producers should specialize (labour intensive agriculture, food 
and beverages, light industry). This is not only caused by the liberal external trade regime, but by the 
lack of quality domestic substitutes of foreign goods.  
What is therefore absolutely necessary for seizing demand opportunities and bringing 
economic growth, both in respect to exports and domestic sales, are changes in production patterns 
and quality adjustments. Producers should simply respond to consumer demand and not be driven by 
inertia or government influences. 
 
2.2. Stimulation of supply response to market demand 
 
Creating a situation in which producers are willing and able to respond to the market demand 
through relevant changes in production patterns is the most important task for the government. There 
are few key directions in this effort. Firstly, it is essential to promote profit orientation of enterprises. 
This means that economic agents should be reacting to price changes both in internal and 
international markets. Price changes should in turn signal changing market demand, including 
changes in preferences towards quality and increasing importance of marketing and advertisements. 
Secondly, distortion-induced attractiveness of non-productive and value detracting activities should 
be diminished. Instead, as a result of the search for business opportunities under a proper legal 
framework, resources should be channelled to the most productive uses. Thirdly, adjustments in 
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production patterns would not be possible without growth of factors of production. This requires an 
increase in investments in physical and human capital and the development of infrastructure. 
However, the most crucial factor that affects all others is the creation of a stable and credible system 
that allows confidence of domestic citizens and foreign investors. 
 
Promoting profit orientation 
 
The basic requirement for promoting profit orientation is the improvement in corporate 
governance. This in turn should be achieved foremost through increasing the share of private sector 
and less state involvement in current economic life. Cash privatisation of state enterprises should be 
accordingly pushed forward in order to create real owners and to reduce the power of insiders. Such 
privatisation is especially important for the development of “strategic” industries. Enterprises that 
still remain in state hands should face a hard-budget constraint, which is necessary for profit 
orientation and restructuring. Loss-making ones, that fail to restructure, should be accordingly 
bankrupted. Correction of failures of voucher privatisation are necessary, the key issue is to provide 
for better control by shareholders and creditors over management. The latter is currently too often 
profiting from asset stripping and transfer pricing rather than from achieving good economic results. 
As small and medium enterprises  (and individual farms) tend to be the most responsive to market 
demand, the most suitable in potentially high-growth sectors (services, food and light industry, 
specialized labour intensive agriculture) and able to create the largest number of new jobs without 
large investments, their growth should be a priority. It should be supported through the more 
favourable regulation (especially simplification of registering procedures and elimination of 
excessive licensing), better and more stable legal protection and administration services focusing less 
on controlling economic activity and more on providing a stable framework, which will facilitate the 
growth and development of the private sector.  
The second requirement for effective profit orientation is the strengthening of the price signal 
and is strongly linked to a better organization of markets. The most important solutions here include 
the promotion of wholesale trade, commodity exchanges and struggle against barter, in-kind 
operations and arrears that diminish price transparency. Another issue involves elimination of 
internal and external barriers to trade and especially elimination of regional market segmentation. 
The role of the state in providing the proper market and transport infrastructure is especially 
important here.  
 
 Reviving agriculture 
 
The situation in agriculture requires special attention regarding the issues highlighted above, 
as in this sector ability to adjust towards market demands are currently especially low. Therefore, the 
development of market-oriented farms is the highest priority and accordingly land privatisation must 
be completed, even if private parcels might are initially of suboptimal size from a technical point of 
view. The importance of the real owner who considers various possibilities of land use and chooses 
the most profitable is far more important than theoretical efficiency considerations. Only fully 
defined ownership rights must then allow for free trade of land and therefore for the voluntary 
creation of more efficient larger farms. Similarly, the process of land consolidation through 
associations should be strictly voluntary and be encouraged only through the development of 
legislation protecting rights of their members. Moreover, better access to banking and credit also is 
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determined by the final settlement of ownership issues and functioning land market - with land titles 
serving as the collateral readily available to farmers. 
The second crucial issue for the development of market-oriented agriculture is the 
transparency of prices in the sector. Farmers should know price structures for agriculture regarding 
inputs and outputs, so that they can assess expected profitability of production. Only such assessment 
allows for good production planning (formulation of business plans), and therefore crediting from 
commercial banks and eventually should lead to  financially viable growth of output. The importance 
of agricultural commodities cannot be overestimated. Commodities set the price based on demand 
and supply. The advantage of well-functioning exchanges is transparency in market prices of 
agricultural products, non-constrained access to information published in newspapers, and the 
establishment of standards in quality of commodities, deliveries, payments, etc. Commodity 
exchanges also give a basis for the development of financial instruments, like future contracts (that 
guarantee a farmer a fixed price at which his product will be purchased in the future) that may further 
strengthen the willingness of banks to lend to the sector. Although the usual practice is the 
spontaneous establishment of agricultural commodities by buyers and sellers, in many transition 
economies the state and local authorities participated in establishment of fully independent 
commodity exchanges13, which might also be recommended for Moldova. 
 
 Restructuring of the energy sector 
 
On the intersection of the general effort to restructure and the development of infrastructure is 
the issue of the energy sector. Until now it is a source of waste and many distortions that have both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic consequences. From the microeconomic perspective, the most 
important is the soft budget constraint that results from low effectiveness of payment collections. It 
allowed many practically bankrupt enterprises to waste energy resources almost freely. This situation 
is giving the first and principal impulse for the development of barter and a system of inter-enterprise 
arrears and arrears towards the government. These in turn led to the proliferation of netting-out 
operations and the widespread use of non-payments that has proved to be one of the key obstacles to 
the efficient functioning of markets. On the other hand, the incoherent policy of energy supply cuts 
became one of key uncertainty factors in production planning. This affects the credibility of 
Moldovan suppliers towards their trading partners, as general cut-offs are often paralysing production 
in financially viable firms. From a macroeconomic perspective, the uncontrolled consumption of 
energy was contributing significantly to the growing current account deficit and external debt 
accumulation. It is especially dangerous as it implies excessive dependence on one trading and 
crediting partner, Russia. Last but least, the energy sector became the focal point for vested interest, 
corruption and fraud. For all these reasons the restructuring of the energy sector is on top of the 
structural reform agenda. The most immediate tasks require the introduction of payment discipline 
and individualized responsibility for non-compliance. This will most likely lead to the rationalization 
of energy consumption and gradual elimination of non-cash operations from the economic life in 
Moldova. In order to introduce these necessary changes, privatisation of the energy sector needs to be 
completed under a well-defined state energy regulatory agency. In a longer term perspective the 
diversification of energy sources and connection to European power networks will be the priority. 
The energy sector is the blood system for the real economy and its reliability and efficiency is 
essential. Restructuring the energy sector is therefore a condition sine qua non for the rebound of 
production and the growth of the economy. 
                                                 
13 See: Antczak (1999) for discussion. 
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Discouraging value-detracting activities 
 
Currently much resources and especially entrepreneurial energy is wasted in non-productive 
activities. Most of them are linked to various forms of rent seeking (search for profits artificially 
created by state induced distortions). The most common distortions include hampering competition 
through extensive licensing and barriers to entry - which encourages monopolistic practice - and 
inducing dependence of economic results on government decisions on unequal treatment of 
enterprises through subsidies or tax exemptions. These distortions need to be removed through “the 
hands-off approach” of the government towards current economic life and more actions towards 
deregulation and demonopolization of markets. Even more dangerous than the attractiveness of rent 
seeking is a good climate for activities that are on the verge of criminal offence. Weak state 
structures, corruption and lack of effective law enforcement give rise to actions ranging from 
smuggling and tax evasion to asset stripping to fraud and racketing. These activities not only divert 
economic resources from productive activities, but also discourage the development of honest 
businesses. A “prisoners’ dilemma” situation is observed. The prevailing rent seeking and racketing 
make honest businesses in Moldova unprofitable and insecure – therefore new business entries do not 
take place and only dishonest operations are attractive - and the situation is only aggravating in time. 
This vicious circle can be stopped by the state’s decisive effort to improve law enforcement, the 
struggle against corruption and the state withdrawal from current economic life.  
Channelling human resources from rent seeking and value-reducing activities towards value 
producing ones is an essential condition for growth, both in economic and human development terms. 
In the simplest terms, the real success of transition is therefore a creation of conditions in which 
relative well-being or even richness can be achieved through high level of education, experience and 
hard work rather then through “political contacts” or readiness to engage in morally doubtful 
operations. 
 
Generating productive investment 
 
The search for business opportunities based on improvements in the production and sales´ 
efficiency requires adjustments and necessary investments. There are two crucial issues that 
determine the level of actual investments. The most fundamental issue of confidence, stability and 
protection of investments are discussed in the next section. Closely related is the issue of financing. 
For a small open economy like Moldova, foreign direct investments are crucial for the development, 
as they bring not only capital but also modern technologies, managerial and marketing oriented 
know-how. Equally important is the effectiveness of the banking system in converting savings into 
productive investments. It would require a further strictly supervised development of capacities of 
commercial banks (including building know-how and experience in crediting real sector) and also the 
reduction of attractiveness of portfolio investments in T-bills. This can be achieved only through the 
consequent tightening of fiscal policy, which is more conducive to growth of productive investments 
than direct lending from the budget. Direct efforts of the government to support investments should 
be undertaken with much caution and be focused on projects with the highest social return, which is 
not fully internalised by private markets: transport infrastructure and human capital development. 
However, it should be strongly underlined, that in most of successful transition countries own 
resources and retained earnings were the major fuel of initial growth. Firms and individuals invested 
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these resources only because an appropriate level of confidence was secured by the state structures. 
In case of Moldova, these resources either remain idle or are transferred abroad. 
 
2.3. Building general confidence  
 
Creating confidence among economic agents, both domestic and foreign, is probably the most 
crucial task for the government. Confidence not only generates foreign direct investments and 
interest in trade with Moldova, but also more profoundly reduces the attractiveness of permanent 
emigration of the most skilled individuals and diminishes capital flight. It also reduces the overall 
level of uncertainty, necessary for investment decisions and business start-ups. It also discourages 
fraud as chances of getting away unpunished are reduced and the importance of good reputation is 
higher in the longer time perspective.  
 
Political and legal structures 
 
Key conditions for building confidence include political stability and most importantly the 
resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. This is absolutely essential as the lack of territorial integrity 
and even the slightest possibility of an armed conflict puts under the question mark any serious 
economic decisions. Other crucial component of building confidence in Moldova is a well-defined 
strategy towards EU accession with fast progress in implementation of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement and the accession to the South-East European Stability Pact. Establishing 
and sticking to the general pro-European development strategy would make all reform efforts 
irreversible and therefore much more credible. Confidence depends equally fundamentally on the 
creation of an effective legal system that really protects citizens, entrepreneurs and contractual 
obligations. Focus on increased law enforcement and the fight against corruption should be the part 
of a wider effort to improve state structures and to rebuild the authority of the state as the guardian of 
legal order. Unless significant progress in this respect is made, the chances for sustainable growth are 
weak. 
 
Macroeconomic stability 
 
Consequently, the implemented strategy of development backed by international institutions 
should increase credibility and consistency of reform policies and bring widely defined economic 
stability. From a macroeconomic perspective, the tightness of fiscal policy is essential, as the 
conservative monetary policy cannot make up for the mistakes in fiscal field and the excessive 
budget deficit brings inflation, accumulation of foreign debt, crowding-out of private investments or 
accumulation of budgetary arrears. All of these are detrimental to long lasting economic stability and 
were at the core of financial crisis in 1998. Economic stability requires therefore a carefully planned 
and consequent effort to generate more tax revenues, mainly through broadening of tax base, that is 
through reducing tax evasion, legalizing the shadow economy and reducing tax exemptions. On the 
expenditure side, more prioritisation is necessary, including introduction of targeted social assistance 
programs, elimination of subsidies and general privileges and focus on development of functioning 
legal institutions and primary health and education services. The establishment of a pension system 
that would both stimulate growth and higher compliance through the link between contributions and 
benefits will be also increasingly important.  
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3. Real sector reforms in 1999-2000 
 
The crisis forced the Moldovan authorities to undertake real reforms that were broadly 
consistent with the development strategy sketched in the previous chapter. The critical situation also 
made the public more likely to accept painful measures necessary to revert the negative tendencies 
accumulated in recent years. Moreover, the large external debt left the country fully dependent on 
the co-operation with international organizations, especially the IMF, and therefore more likely to 
accept their policy advice. Indeed, the new cabinet of young and liberal reformers voted in March 
1999 initiated a more energetic program of reforms and arguably, it was the first government in the 
office that was truly determined to introduce real reforms. Although this government was forced to 
resign in the end of 1999 due to the political backfire to the program of privatisation of wine and 
tobacco industries14, the new government (to some surprise of local observers) continued 
consequently the reform efforts. The most focus has been put on the areas, where progress is 
relatively easiest to achieve, provided that there is a political will or enough external pressure from 
international organisations. Accordingly, privatisation was accelerated and fiscal policies adjusted. 
Much slower progress has been noted in the institutional and legal basis of the economic life and 
real restructuring. 
  
3.1. Land reform 
 
The largest achievement of structural reforms in Moldova since 1998 is undoubtedly the 
acceleration in the land reform. During 1998-2000, significant progress was made in the break-up of 
large-scale collective farm and privatisation of agricultural land. The nationwide phase of the 
National Program “Land” was launched in March 1998 and it was completed by the end of 2000. As 
a result, 989 large-scale collective farms (96% of total number and 75% of the agricultural land) were 
broken-up and agricultural land titles for more than one million hectares were distributed to 800 
thousand farmers. For the first time since the II World War, farmers can themselves make decisions 
about the most optimal usage of land, capital and labour. A fast process of land concentration 
followed. It is very important, that farmers choose leaders on a voluntary and democratic basis with 
the sole purpose of increase of agricultural production efficiency. So far, farms greater than 100 
hectares have been formed on over 69 % of all land distributed in the national land program and 
farms having more than 500 hectares – 23% of land. Consolidation is proceeding mainly through 
lease agreements concluded on total land area of 700 thousand hectares. The land market in Moldova 
is practically still no-existent due to lack of implementation of the regulation, especially the still non-
operational national cadastre system (although the work on it is very advanced now). Also the 
development of market institutions in agriculture, including commodities and wholesale centres, the 
insurance system and access to the banking system has hardly begun. However, a three-year post-
privatisation program will be launched on January 1, 2001 with the aim to support and develop 
mortgage crediting, offer juridical consultations, create about 72 agricultural shops and centres to 
serve farmers. Success of the development of market-oriented farms will be the most important 
stimulation to the growth of Moldovan economy, the result is however still difficult to predict as 
vested interest groups still oppose the free trade of land as well as transparent and liberalised trade in 
agriculture products. 
 
                                                 
14 See the section on privatisation. 
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3.2. Privatisation 
 
The second key development in the post-crisis period is the acceleration of privatisation. 
Since the beginning of the 90s, three privatisation programs were adopted and implemented, the first 
one - for patrimonial bonds - in 1994, the second - mixed privatisation for bonds and cash - in 1995-
1996, and, finally, privatisation for cash exclusively in 1997-1998. All programs were heavily 
delayed, implemented fragmentally and highly politicised. While state management proved to be 
very inefficient, the most important weakness in the privatisation process largely conducted on non-
cash basis was the lack of improvement in corporate governance in the privatised companies. Two 
thirds of all property for privatisation against patrimonial bonds is controlled by investment funds15. 
On one had, due to shortcomings of the legislative base, the funds could not control managers. On the 
other hand, the funds themselves gave in to the temptation of gaining unjustified profits through 
transfer pricing and asset stripping. In order to stimulate corporate governance more oriented towards 
shareholder value, the National Security Commission strengthened significantly in 1999 the 
standards of disclosing information as well as regulation of purchases of the control package. These 
improvements are however unlikely to change the situation considerably. More important changes 
after 1998 have entailed the full endorsement of cash privatisation strategy in case of enterprises 
remaining in state hands16. Accordingly, cash privatisations accelerated significantly, especially in 
the case of enterprises in key-industries. These enterprises were initially excluded from the 
privatisation process, as the government tried to keep control of them (especially in energy sector), 
because of strategic considerations. This choice had very negative consequences, as after the rapid 
accumulation of arrears in recent years, suppliers gained eventually the ownership in Moldovan 
enterprises through non-transparent debt for equity swaps. It meant that by restraining the 
privatisation in the first place, the government achieved the most dreadful outcome. Moreover, even 
recent privatisations of natural monopolies do not generate expected revenues as delay caused the 
gradual decapitation and deterioration of financial condition of enterprises and made them 
unattractive to foreign investors.  
 
Energy sector 
 
In mid-1999, the long-awaited privatisation of the public gas company Moldovagaz took place. 
Without the announcement of a tender the Russian gas supplier Gazprom took a majority stake in 
“Moldovagaz” in exchange for reduction of energy arrears. “Moldovagaz” was registered in 1999 
with following distribution of shares: the government of Moldova -36 percent of shares, Gazprom - 
50 percent plus one share, and the administration of Tiraspol - 14 percent. The Moldovan government 
also had to accept the responsibility towards the Russian partner for all debt of the enterprise. This 
transaction is highly non-transparent and until now is not fully finalized.  It is also uncertain and 
rather unlikely whether it can improve the functioning and efficiency of the energy sector. 
Uncontrolled borrowing policy and lack of political decisions of the government in 1992-1998 have 
resulted therefore in indebtedness and even higher dependence on the Russian trade partners. 
Similarly, the privatisation of the state fuel company “Tirex-Petrol”, former monopoly, was 
not proceeding till 1999, as the influential political forces lobbied for crediting of agriculture through 
                                                 
15 See: Ellerman (1998) for discussion of the role of investment funds in voucher privatization in transition 
economies. 
16 See: Mihalyi (1999) for analysis. 
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the company in the form of fuel. During these years the enterprise has been practically lead to 
bankruptcy.  When in July 1999 the parliament adopted the law about the privatisation of Tirex-
Petrol", 51 percents of the state shares in the company were offered to the Romanian party on 
account of arrears for deliveries. However at the last stage of negotiations it was unexpectedly found 
out, that “Tirex-Petrol” had accounts payable before German firm “Mabanaft” unknown at the 
previous stages of negotiation. Finally, “Mabanaft” took over ownership through direct negotiation 
with the government. This example illustrates not only the quality of the management of privatisation 
process and the uncertainty that foreign investors face while considering investments in Moldova, but 
also the weak control that the government has over state enterprises. 
More encouraging has been the progress achieved in the restructuring of electric energy 
distribution in years 1999-2000. This is probably the only example of a prepared and consequently 
implemented (although delayed) privatisation project in Moldova. In December 1998 the Law On the 
Individual Project of Privatisation of Energy Sector Enterprises was adopted by the parliament. The 
former state monopoly “Moldenergo” electric utility was broken into nine separate firms specialized 
in generation, distribution and transmission activities. The first stage of the project involves 
privatisation of electricity distribution companies, while the second stage involves a simultaneous 
privatisation of the heat and power production plants. In summer 1999, the government of Moldova 
announced an open international tender for the privatisation of the electricity distribution companies. 
Of the nine companies, which applied for the preliminary selection stage, eight firms were admitted 
to the main tender stage, but after a resignation of the reformist government in the end of 1999, six 
firms have withdrawn their applications. In the end only two firms; “Union Fenosa” and 
“LuganskOblEnergo” participated in tender. At the beginning of 2000 “Union Fenosa” has won the 
tender on a privatisation of three (from five) distributive networks. “Union Fenosa” was also the only 
company that responded to the tender of remained two distributive networks in the end of 2000, as 
the trust of investors has not been recovered. The crucial factor of the political instability in 
undertaking privatisation projects is also reflected in the privatisation of thermal power stations 
(CETs). Not a single application has been submitted to the tender commission by the November 2000 
deadline. Chances of a privatisation of CETs are very uncertain as prospects of new elections make 
foreign investors very reluctant to commit to the long-term presence in the country. It is also under 
question mark, whether privatisation of the Chisinau heating supplier S.A. "Termocom" might be 
completed successfully soon, although the government agreed to forgive the enterprise debts in a 
move to attract more investors. 
The experience is therefore mixed. What is the most important achievement is that new owner 
of electricity networks increased payment discipline, what allowed for the elimination of single 
largest distortion from economic life in Moldova. On the other hand this success was achieved by the 
privatisation of the natural monopolist at very favourable conditions. However, this is a price that 
Moldova has to pay for waiting so long with launching privatisation projects. In any case, the bad 
situation of enterprises and financing needs of the budget leave the government no option, but to 
privatise. 
 
Wine and tobacco 
 
Wine making and tobacco are two the most prospective branches of Moldovan industry. The 
lack of real ownership and restructuring put a barrier to their development and this situation has not 
been changed in 1999 and 2000 due to political controversies and powerful vested interest. In the end 
of 1999, the reformist government actually has been removed from office and the cooperation with 
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international organisations broken, exactly because of failure to privatise these enterprises 17. The 
decision on privatisation accepted finally by the parliament in October 2000 does not bring any 
guarantee that this time the privatisation really will take place, as important political groups continue 
to profit from the current situation. Without privatisation, the financial situation of the enterprises, 
especially wineries, will continue to deteriorate and chances for fast production and export growth 
that could stimulate other sectors of economy would be wasted. However neither the parliament nor 
general public in Moldova has developed this understanding, so if privatisation finally takes place, it 
will be the sole result of IMF and World Bank pressures. 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Privatisation of state enterprise “Moldtelecom” is an extreme example of inefficient management of 
the privatisation process in Moldova. On the one hand, during the last 5 years the governments 
declared necessity of “Moldtelecom” privatisation according to the requirements of the international 
financial organizations, on the other hand, process of privatisation was delayed by all accessible 
means. Especially since July 1999, after adoption of the law “On individual project of reorganization 
and privatisation of state enterprise Moldtelecom”, practically there were no obstacles to the 
privatisation. Delay of the process led to reduction in the market price, as in last two years 
Moldtelecom practically lost monopoly for long distance calls to internet-phone companies and is not 
able to respond properly to rapid development of mobile telephone services. 
 
Privatisation: Summary 
 
Although the process of privatisation has been significantly accelerated in the period 
following the crisis, much of work has to be done in the future. At the end of 2000 the privatisation 
neither of leading winemaking and tobacco enterprises, nor “Moldtelecom”, nor heating and 
electricity enterprises, nor heating distribution was carried out. Out of the 1,155 companies included 
in the privatisation program for 1997-1998, only 661 companies have been privatised so far. As a 
consequence of years of neglect and consequent reduction of market value of enterprises combined 
with high political instability, it is very difficult to attract investors, even to participation in the 
privatisation of natural monopolies. The key issue during a privatisation is the resistance of directors 
of the privatised enterprises, which are not wishing to lose the control over assets18. This is because 
high level of corruption and incompetence of state ownership allows managers to draw unjustified 
personal profits at the expense of enterprises. The government therefore has no options: cash 
privatisation is the only realistic solution for improvements in corporate governance and reduction of 
fraud in state owned enterprises. Moreover, only privatisation proceeds might allow for timely 
service of debt and financing from international organisations is conditional on progress of 
privatisation.  
 
3.3. Bankruptcy and restructuring 
 
                                                 
17 At the 1999-2000 the fulfillment of privatization program for tobacco and leading winemaking companies 
becomes one of the main conditions of renewal of the financing of Moldova from the IMF and WB. 
18 See: Djankov, S. (1998) for detailed analysis. 
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The hard budget constraint and the control of creditors may contribute to better corporate 
governance and elimination of the non-payment culture. Especially the consequent and efficient 
implementation of the bankruptcy law mechanisms can ensure financial discipline and development 
of viable strategies in enterprises. Only recently however there is a political will to actually bankrupt 
loss-making companies, whose exclusive result of operations is the accumulation of debts. 
Accordingly, in early 1999 the government has adopted the decision that committed Ministry of 
Finance not only to speed up a development of new national standards of book keeping, but also to 
initiate promptly bankruptcy of the loss making enterprises, whose overdue debts before the state 
budget exceeded 5 million lei The same recommendation was given to the Social Fund while power 
enterprises were committed to initiate bankruptcy of enterprises, having energy debts exceeding 1 
million lei. Although over the last three years the economic court declared as insolvent 213 
companies (practically none before the end of 1997), the number of  actual bankruptcy procedures is 
much lower than their potential number. Even as the understanding of the necessity to bankrupt 
enterprises is rising, there are important obstacles to efficient proceedings, including foremost low 
quality of law and lack of functioning judiciary. 
 
Bankruptcy Law 
 
The first variant of the bankruptcy law was adopted by the parliament at the beginning of 
1992. Poor quality of preparation of this law and absence of legal institutions for its implementation 
has caused practical non-appearance of bankruptcy procedures until the end of 1997. Improvement of 
the legislation and mechanisms of bankruptcy procedure became therefore a priority for the 
government and the parliament in 1999 and 2000. The goal was to provide a more efficient and 
credible legal environment in order to optimise company liquidation procedures and therefore 
establish the shortest possible legal process, without loss in fairness. Accordingly, the parliament 
adopted in March 1999 amendments to the bankruptcy law, allowing for the simplification and 
acceleration of procedures. The adopted amendments have appeared insufficient. At present, a new 
variant of the law on bankruptcy is being developed, again with the purpose of establishing firm and 
simple bankruptcy procedures and extending the powers of state creditors. However, even the prompt 
approval of the new law will allow streamlining bankruptcies and therefore increasing the financial 
discipline in the economy, only if the effective judiciary is created.  
 
Judiciary 
 
The efficiency of any bankruptcy procedures implementation depends on the quality of the 
judiciary institutions. However there are only two economic courts in Moldova (Chisinau district 
economic court and economic court of Republic of Moldova). In spite of their key role and 
substantial income they generate to the budget, there is also a problem of insufficient financing of 
these structures. There are only 12 judges within district court and each of them considers annually 
more than thousand legal cases, which means that it takes years to complete a particular case. The 
legislation provides also for own law enforcement of economic court decisions, but because of lack 
of financing this provision is not respected. Only recently has the economic court of Republic of 
Moldova prepared the draft of the law providing for the creation of two new economic courts (at the 
north and at the south of Moldova) and the increase of the number of the judges for Chisinau district 
court up to 16 persons. However the budget for 2001 is not providing funds for these purposes. 
Unless expenditures on judiciary are strictly prioritised in the budget, the prospects for more effective 
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economic law enforcement are marginal. 
 
Financial restructuring 
 
As an alternative to the bankruptcy procedures some potentially viable enterprises are 
undergoing restructuring process. The reorganization plans are elaborated and implemented by these 
companies with the support of the Council of Creditors and ARIA (Agency for Enterprise 
Restructuring and Assistance). Restructuring and reorganization activities with ARIA technical 
assistance have achieved some success between 1997 and 2000. However, experts insisted on 
creation of the new legal rules for the acceleration of restructuring processes. Accordingly, in early 
1999 the government has approved the decision “On urgent measures on restructuring and financial 
improvement of the industrial enterprises”. Although many rules of this decision are not executed up 
to now some improvements in restructuring process with the benefit of participating companies have 
been reported. This achievement is particularly important as currently over 33 percent of the 
industrial enterprises currently do not operate or operate in much below capacities, generating looses. 
 
3.4. Development of short and medium enterprises 
 
The creation of a competitive private sector is a necessary precondition for development of the 
real sector of economy19. While the privatisation of large industries is very important, the majority of 
Moldova’s enterprises began operations only after 1995 and newly created enterprises (excluding 
agricultural farms) amount to 81.8% of today’s firms. These firms are usually of small and medium 
size as such firms require the least investments, are efficient in the underdeveloped sector of services 
and can quickly react to changes in demand. Still, the largest part of small and medium enterprises 
(about 166,000 or 84.8%) operate in the field of unorganised business as self-employed individuals. 
Until the end of 1998, there was no suitable regulation of such businesses. As a result smallest firms 
were pushed into the shadow economy and had huge problems of obtaining bank credit. Only in the 
end of 1998, the law “On entrepreneurial patent” was adopted by the parliament. This law allowed 
for the legalization of the smallest firms, however its low quality allowed for much ambiguity and 
various interpretations and for that reason it has been changed already two times (April and 
November 1999). It obviously contributed to the poor effectiveness and low popularity of the new 
legislation. Accordingly, only about 26 thousand persons hold entrepreneurial patents at the end of 
2000, i.e. only 20-25 % of the potential number. Moreover approximately 90 % of all patents are 
given out to firms involved in trade, with not much development of small production enterprises.  
What has been hardly changed in Moldova in recent two years is the high degree of state 
interference in enterprises activity. In this respect, the single most important obstacle for 
entrepreneurial activity is in the large number of licences. So far only some work has been 
undertaken towards better organisation of licensing and eliminating the excessive freedom of the 
government to set up new licences. Until 1999 licensing was realized on the basis of government 
decisions. Such decisions were approved in 1990, 1995, 1997 and 1998. At the beginning of 1999 the 
Constitutional Court of Moldova has recognized these decisions as unconstitutional. According to the 
new Law “On licensing of activities” adopted in June 1999, there are 13 ministries, the National 
Bank, 3 departments and 10 other state bodies issuing licenses for 106 types of activities. Although 
                                                 
19 The private sector constitutes 62 % of value of enterprises assets, 86 %. of net sales, 76 % of employment and 
66 % of GDP in Moldova. 
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the new law put an end to the “spontaneous” licensing, the number of licences itself should be 
considerably reduced in order to streamline the registration, licensing, and administrative procedures 
that hamper the establishment of new enterprises and pushes others towards operations in the shadow 
economy. Licensing procedures and the frequent controls by tax officers are also the most common 
opportunities for “taxing” small and medium enterprises in the most devastating way; i.e. through 
predatory corruption. For some time there existed the belief that moderate corruption may “oil” the 
bureaucratic machinery. In Moldova the opposite effect was however taking place – regulation was 
complicated precisely in purpose of generating opportunities for rent seeking and bribes. Uncertainty 
about the size and frequency of forced payments of this kind makes the opening of a new business a 
very risky decision. Yet, the problem of corruption has not been seriously addressed in any way so 
far, there was not a single high-ranked official convicted for corruption so far. 
At the same time small and medium enterprises face acute problems of financing. The high 
interest rates of crediting (32-35% in 1999) limit access of enterprises to financial resources. The 
majority of representatives of small business have no knowledge and experience for work with 
credits, also banks are reluctant to lend to the sector. Accordingly, during 1999 only 11.2% of 
businesses invested in the purchase or rent of fixed assets. The last two years have brought some 
improvements in this respect. The most importantly, with a reduction of the budget deficit 
commercial banks lost the most important source of income – interest earned on T-bonds, the share 
of credit to the government in the total stock of money increased to estimated 51% in 2000 from 87% 
at the end of 199820. There is some indication that banks indeed try to make credit products more 
accessible to smaller enterprises. It is believed that this process will be further accelerated in 2001. 
The National Bank of Moldova supports this process through the constant strengthening of the 
banking system and the attraction of foreign investors. Alongside with commercial banks realizing 
micro crediting still rather reluctantly, specialized enterprises for micro crediting are operating at the 
wider scale. Simplified procedures of crediting allows issuing credits usually within 10 days from the 
date of the first appointment, and up to $ 2000 - during 4 days; that is very attractive for small 
business. The state also started to act more actively in the interest of the sector. In mid-of-1999 the 
State Program for support of small entrepreneurship for 1999-2002 was adopted. Within the 
framework of this program the Ministry of Finance approved the rules of granting tax credits to small 
and micro-enterprises. The program envisages three-year long vacations in paying the value-added 
tax for 2 groups of firms - small enterprises employing 6 to 19 people and having an annual turnover 
of 3 million lei, and for micro-enterprises having up to 5 workers and a turnover of one million lei. 
The mechanism of tax credits allocation is imperfect, with plenty of bureaucratic procedures. 
Therefore, to take advantage of these privileges is possible only to a few representatives of small 
business. Presumptive tax law for small enterprises is also considered as the stimulation for the 
growth of this dynamic sector of the economy. 
Tax exemptions (which in Moldova always can be possibly revoked anyway) are however not 
crucial for the development of the sector, rather stability of law and regulation is essential. Therefore 
it needs to be concluded that in spite of some improvements, a favourable climate for development of 
small and medium business in Moldova is not created yet. As bureaucratic impediments persist and 
the corruption remains high, the shadow economy prospers and entries to the legal business life are 
scarce. Legalization of activities would be more profitable only if legal activity would guarantee legal 
protection, reduce predatory treatment, and allow for the access to banking sector. Such 
                                                 
20 Note however, that very high ratio in 1998 was partly a result of the direct credit extended by central bank to 
the government during the peak of the crisis in the last months of the year. 
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improvements of the environment for SME development, conducive to investments are still moderate 
or non-existent. 
 
3.5. Rule of law and business environment 
 
An effective legal system that protects contracts and property in an enforceable manner is the 
first condition for development of private entrepreneurship. The Civil Code adopted originally in 
1964 does not correspond to the current legal and economic reality, as the law was heavily influenced 
by communist ideology. By opinion of experts, the Civil Code in present shape lacks roughly one 
third of necessary norms and concepts in regulating life in the market economy. Parallel functioning 
of Civil Code stipulations and provisions of recently adopted laws that bring different solutions to the 
regulations of similar legal relations, creates conflicts and ambiguities in the process of application of 
the law. Accordingly, the work on creation of new Civil Code began in 1997. In October 2000 under 
pressure of IMF the parliament passed in the first reading one of the three drafts of the Civil Code, 
worked out by a group of university scholars under guidance of a German TA project. This project 
will be the basis for further debates in the second reading. It might be combined with elements of the 
other two drafts – one worked out by the Moldovan presidency and one by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development. There is some moderate optimism, as the adoption of Civil Code in June 
2001 is strictly required by international financial organisations. The further delay could become the 
large impediment for market development. However, even if the code is adapted it remains an open 
question, how effectively will it be enforced, as the juridical system remains very weak and 
undercapitalised and law enforcement is impeded by corruption.  
Among the main impediments to business developments are often changes of the legislation, 
including retroactive modifications. During 1998, for example, there were at least four rounds of 
changes on the rules governing incentives for foreign investors. Investors are also concerned about 
the policy for removing the incentives that have already been approved. Also at the end of 2000 the 
parliament has adopted a set of modifications to some laws, according to which the state has the right 
to demand the cancellation of court decisions on sequestrations of property of public utilities issued 
since January 1, 1999.  
In summary, some progress in building up legislation in line with requirements of the market 
economy has been achieved. However, frequent changes in laws are  introduced in an unsystematic 
and contradictory way sending the wrong signals to existing and potential investors, for whom 
stability, consistency and transparency of legal base are very  important.21 At the same time law 
enforcement institutions remain very weak. 
  
3.6. Fiscal consolidation 
 
A fiscal consolidation was the crucial component of post-crisis policy adjustment. While it 
was mainly forced by lack of financing and involved radical cuts in the expenditures, structural 
reforms in the budget sphere have been necessary to make the program more sustainable. Changes 
were introduced in more consistent framework of medium tem planning introduced with the help of 
German technical assistance, while more realistic revenue forecasting through the same project 
allowed for better budgeting and reductions in expenditure commitments.  
 
                                                 
21 Moldova. A diagnostic review of the environment for foreign investment. – MIGA, May 1999. 
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3.6.1. Tax revenues 
 
Figure 10. Selected tax revenues as % of GDP 
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 Source: Ministry of Finance, own calculations, 2000 forecast from GTZ macroeconomic model. 
Overall, the figures do not show improvements in tax collection in recent two years, on the 
contrary, the year 1999 exhibited a marked decrease of tax (mainly VAT) revenues as a share of 
GDP. This might be partly explained by the adjustment in composition of GDP in 1999, i.e. reduction 
of consumption and imports22. The picture would be more favourable, only if cash revenues were 
taken into account and, more importantly, while the figures might not be very encouraging the 
undergoing process of institutional reform should be generally appreciated. 
 
Tax administration 
 
Work is pending on the new tax code. The chapter on tax administration is planned to be 
approved in March 2001 and was passed by parliament in the first reading. This law foresees large 
empowerment of the financial guard, the most effective arm of tax enforcement. It will be invested 
with special rights to carry out operative and sudden control over the tax compliance, to penetrate 
into public and private premises, to arrest property, to stop vehicles, to carry out investigations, to use 
physical force and weapons, to 'implant' agents into any company or enterprise, to carry out 
independent investigations and to send findings directly to court, not to the police or prosecutor's 
office”23. Ministry of Finance managed also to pass through the parliament in the first reading the 
legislation empowering tax authorities to get from the banks any demanded information on their 
clients (even classified as trade secrecy), to suspend the flow of payments from banking accounts, to 
penalize enterprises, high-ranking executives and individuals. Unless an economic entity has fully 
discharged their tax liabilities, tax offices will have the right to refuse a certificate allowing opening 
and maintaining two or more accounts with unrelated banks. Nor will be such entity allowed to close 
available accounts24. These changes, if introduced might increase the efficiency of the tax collections. 
                                                 
22 Similarly, expected good VAT collections in 2000 are mainly due to the very rapid growth of imports and 
consumption this year. 
23 Source: Infotag Financial 
24 Ibid 
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On the other hand however, they may have negative impact on the development of private companies 
and a functioning banking system, virtually defenceless against widely corrupted tax officers. 
There have been other efforts to introduce a modern tax administration system already taking 
place in last two years. Important, but only potentially, is the establishment of the Large Taxpayer 
Unit at the end of 1998, a separate body for monitoring and tracking the major tax-payers - 626 
enterprises, whose annual turnover exceeds 10 million lei. The list includes companies (especially 
engaged in import and export activities) obliged to pay the largest VAT, excises, duties and income 
tax. The Large Taxpayer Unit is however not operationally effective due to lack of resources and 
technical assistance, or, as might be argued, because of strong vested interested constraining its 
operations. Since 1999 tax officers are also more determined to seize the property of tax defaulters. 
This experience has to be given a mixed assessment: while it increased fiscal discipline, such seizures 
are highly non-transparent and especially the value of arrested property is determined in an arbitrary 
way. Moreover, similarly as in case of in-kind payments, Ministry of Finance has a major problem in 
selling the property. At the same time there is no control over it and it is widely believed to be subject 
to fraud. Only direct seizures of banking accounts can be seen as radical, but effective way of tax 
liability collections.  
As a result of all these measures and proposals, tax collections in years 1999 and 2000 are 
believed to be significantly stricter. Available statistics however do not confirm the anecdotal 
evidence, number of audits, discovered violations and number of imposed payments are all in the 
decreasing trend – while tax evasion was most likely on the rise in examined years.  
Table 3. Struggle against tax evasion 
 1997 1998 1999 
Number of audits 17,541 15,345 12,103 
Number of detected violations 9,233 9003 7,167 
Imposed payments (MDL mln) 290 375 168 
Actual payments (MDL mln) 39 50 50 
Source:  State Tax Inspectorate. 
 
Only one element of the program of improving tax administration has been undoubtedly 
successful, that is the elimination of non-cash payments to the budget, that used to contribute heavily 
to the development of non-payment culture and related distortions in Moldovan economy. As a result 
of tough conditions, imposed mainly by IMF programs, these transactions have been sharply reduced, 
especially between budgetary institutions and the energy sector. It should be noted that while 
revenues to the state budget are recently almost exclusively executed in cash, revenues to local 
budgets contain a higher share of netting-out. There are also encouraging attempts to reduce in-kind 
payment to the Social Fund. In this respect, important improvement was that the State Tax 
Inspectorate took over functions of revenue collections of Social Fund, which increased the 
efficiency of collection of contributions. 
 
Table 4. Netting-out operations – revenues of consolidated budget 
 1998 1999 2000Q3 2000E 2001E 
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MDL mln 975.5 350 148.5 187 148.5 
Share of revenues 36% 11% 5% 5% 3% 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
This gradual elimination of netting-out operations will affect positively tax collections and 
also efficiency of budgetary expenditures in medium period. More profoundly, elimination of 
netting-out operations attacks the roots of non-payment culture in Moldova and therefore contributes 
to a more transparent economic life with diminished opportunities for fraud, tax evasion and rent 
seeking.  
 
Tax law 
 
The new tax code strives to put together VAT measures that are in force and stop the practice 
of annual VAT legislation changes through the budget bills. It also aims at the full change towards 
the destination principle. This issue is complex, as in reality it requires the cooperation with major 
trade partners. Indeed Moldova and Russia are discussing the draft of a bilateral agreement on 
collecting indirect taxes on the destination principle. As for now, Russian authorities keep on levying 
taxes by the origin principle. The situation is particularly troublesome for Moldova in the field of oil-
product and gas imports as related revenues are directed exclusively to the Russian budget. The 
improvement achieved so far in 1999 and 2000 were related to the reduction of VAT exemptions, 
while granting of new exemptions has been much more rare than in previous years25, which 
contributed to a more equitable and transparent system. Introduction of VAT in agriculture for 5% 
(20% basic rate) in 1999 is the key achievement. While in 1999 almost all kinds of agricultural 
produce were still exempted, in the year 2000 the list of exemptions has been substantially shortened. 
Also producers of bread, milk and dairy have to pay a 8 percent VAT since 1999 and 5% VAT on the 
imports of gas were also introduced in 2000. Some efforts are however contradictory: for example in 
late 1999, the Moldovan parliament cancelled the three-year VAT exemption for foreign investors26. 
This decision, though positive for the budget has further deteriorated the image of Moldovan 
authorities, which illustrates the negative consequences of an incoherent reform strategy.  
The Moldovan parliament has passed in the first reading a chapter of the tax code on excise 
duties. The bill envisages the introduction of the so-called 'excise duty certificate’, that should result 
in more effective taxation of manufacturers of goods subject to excise. A complete switch to the 
destination principle is also foreseen. Ministry of Finance attempts also to rationalize excise taxes, as 
it is planned to eliminate excise tax on all goods except tobacco products, alcohol and alcoholic 
beverages, imported cars and petroleum products. This work is however lagging and the list of 
excised goods remains long and contains items that are difficult to tax, and that not bring substantial 
revenues. This reduces the overall efficiency of the tax collection system. Interesting solutions were 
applied in case of excise on cigarettes. For legalizing cigarette imports Ministry of Finance proposed 
to decrease tax burden on importers. The experiment gave positive results, at 1 November 2000 
budget revenues from cigarettes excise was 107 million lei, therefore twice higher than in the 
previous year. Before 1999 revenues from this source were marginal as illegal imports practically 
monopolized the market. By reducing excise rates in the budget for 2001, the government hopes to 
                                                 
25 Temporary tax holiday for oil importers in 2000 is one of main exceptions. 
26 See the section on legal reform 
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resolve also the problem of smuggling of oil products. So far the volume of illegal imports is at least 
as large as official. However the real crack on smuggling and related tax evasion cannot be achieved 
until Moldova has well-defined, supervised borders with a functioning customs system. 
 
 
 
Customs reform 
The new Customs Code, based on EU standards, was passed to the parliament in July 2000. 
Introduction of export and import monitoring in correspondence with international nomenclature 
should provide the basis for improved revenue collections. There also have been investments in fiscal 
posts in years 1999 and 2000. Further on, a tender to hire an import pre-inspection service has been 
completed. Although some points of the agreement signed in early 2000 with a selected firm may 
indeed be seen as problematic (as it is not absolutely clear how activities of pre-inspection should be 
coordinated with those of regular customs), the new service will undoubtedly increase the efficiency 
of the system and lead to a decrease in corruption and smuggling. However in the end of 2000 the 
implementation phase has been halted by the parliament and the basic reasoning would suggest that it 
was a result of vested interest pressures.  
Notwithstanding some improvements in customs administration, the most important issue of 
practically transparent external border with Ukraine, especially via Transnistria, remains unresolved. 
To address the problem, the government established 30 mobile and 17 fixed fiscal posts as a 
substitute to fully-fledged custom system in April 1999. However, in spite of first encouraging 
results, the collected revenues remained weak, main reasons being poorly defined responsibilities and 
insufficient financing of the posts. These imperfections derive from an essential political problem 
that is a lack of resolution of Transnistrian conflict. Although Transnistria is in practice conducting 
independent tax and custom policy, Moldovan authorities are reluctant to establish and finance the 
real border as it could be seen as acknowledgement of Transnistrian independence. As the settlement 
of territorial dispute is distant, prospects for effective tariff and fiscal policy remain weak..  
 
3.6.2. Elimination of expenditure commitments 
 
Figure 11. Government expenditures as % of GDP 
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For many years the government could not reduce expenditure commitments. Instead, the 
accumulation of arrears and direct sequestration was taking place, which had a negative impact on 
the efficiency of expenditures. The squeeze of available financing after the crisis could not however 
be compensated by unsustainable ad hoc expenditure reductions. Under additional pressure from 
donor organizations, expenditure commitments started to be cut back in years 1999-2000. While 
some savings were made through the reduction of subsidies, the large part of reduction of non-
interest payments had to be made in the social sphere.  
 
Reduction of privileges and subsidies 
Definitely the most important reform in this field was the elimination of large number of non-
targeted privileges to the population and the rationalization of the energy subsidization. In 1999 
measures were taken to reduce compensations for heating and energy. More fundamental reform was 
introduced in the year 2000, when a new law annulled various privileges envisaged in 16 different 
laws, such as privileges for communal services, energy and transport that cost a budget about 600 
million lei annually (that is about 20% of budget revenues in 1999). Instead of these generous 
privileges for all (and in practice the most privileged population of big cities, especially Chisinau), 
the parliament passed a separate law on targeted cash compensations available to only few the most 
vulnerable groups: invalids, disabled children, World War II veterans, pensioners the victims of 
Soviet-era political repressions and families of victims of Chernobyl disaster. The aggregate figure of 
such compensations represents just one fifth of costs of the previous privileges and will be available 
to some 225 thousand people (while the number of pensioners living in this republic exceeds 700 
thousand). Cash compensations will be paid directly to beneficiaries and there will be no direct 
subsidies to energy companies (that were taking place through complex netting-out operations 
previously). The reform would therefore support the strategy of tackling the poverty through targeted 
social assistance and at the same time reduce the extent of non-payment culture. 
In 1999 subsidies to vineyards, diary and milk production were also eliminated. However, 
partly as a consequence of draught, partly as a stimulus of land privatisation and partly as a result of 
populism, subsidies to agriculture remain at roughly the same level since 1999, although a reduction 
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with respect to earlier years has been achieved. Elimination of subsidies is important not only for the 
state budget, but also as a condition for real restructuring of enterprises and elimination of rent 
seeking. 
 
Administration reform and public sector employment 
The Law on Administrative and Territorial Reform is effective since January 1999, with the 
number of local administrations cut from 38 to 11. Further on, the Law on Local Public Finances was 
submitted to parliament in June 1999 and will be effective since January 2000. The law not only 
codifies the relations between the central budget and local governments’ budgets, set norms for local 
budget preparation and execution, but also streams towards more financial independence and 
decentralization, essential for better expenditure targeting. Accordingly, 100% from enterprise 
income tax and value added tax on goods and services will be retained by local authorities (50% 
percent recently)27. This will allow for more discretion of local authorities in deciding on 
expenditures, while restrictions on borrowings should prevent debt accumulation. As a result of the 
reform, the local administration employment was reduced by roughly 10 thousand.  
There were also other large cuts in public sector employment in the period following the 
crisis. It fell from 332 thousand in early 1998 to 309 thousand in 1999 and to 285 thousand in 2000. 
Some efficiency gains were also achieved. However in order to strengthen state structures and to 
increase the quality of public sector services, more systematic changes are required. More 
specifically, it is necessary to recruit employees only on the base of contracts with precise 
responsibilities and performance targets allowing for better evaluation and more performance-
oriented remuneration.  
 
Social Sphere 
A significant part of the public sector employment reductions took place in education and 
health care. As a result, expenditures in these sectors have fallen strongly between 1998 and 2000 
(with especially deep decline in 1999). Large savings were achieved in education due to the 
rationalization of number of schools and reduction of weekly teaching days down to 5. The average 
number of students for one teacher was also increased. While these changes cannot be seen as 
positive developments per se, it is much better to reduce expenditures through systematic and 
monitored changes rather than through ad hoc cuts and developments of wage arrears, as it was 
taking place before 1999. Still the education policy lacks prioritisation, necessary at period of 
financial distress. The higher school reform needs also more attention, as the state continues to 
support institutions, which train specialists in non-demanded qualifications, while there is virtually 
no support for private, market oriented education incentives.  
Similarly, deep cuts in employment and expenditures have taken place in the health care 
system. In 1999 alone, the real-value of the health care budget was reduced by around 40% in 
comparison to 1998. Savings involved closing of some hospitals, switching from hospital to 
ambulatory services and reducing non-medical staff. Increasing focus has been put on primary 
services. Most importantly, the very restrictive list of free of charge services has been established. 
                                                 
27 For Chisinau these shares are increased to 50% and 10% for income and value added tax, respectively (40% 
and 10% before the reform). 
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Since 1999 only the most essential services like emergency, natal care, vaccinations and diabetics are 
rendered free of charge, all other health services require now some patient co-payments While these 
decisions are extremely tough and would not be accepted in any other European country, it seems a 
better strategy to introduce reductions openly rather than cut expenditures through arrears and 
sequestration. 
  Finally, some progress has been achieved in introducing of pension system more supportive 
to the market economy development and with stronger correlation between contributions and pension 
benefits. This reform could improve compliance and reduce the shadow economy. Accordingly, the 
parliament adopted the strategy of pension insurance system in the end of 1998 and laws on state 
social insurance, non-state pensions funds, calculation and payments of pensions, minimum pension 
etc. in the period 1998 – 2000. Although these developments are undoubtedly positive, experience 
proved that the path from the legislation to implementation of law in Moldova is very long. 
Therefore, it is still uncertain what the future of the reform would be.  
 
3.6.3. Fiscal stabilisation: summary 
 
Significant efforts have been made in order to increase the quality of tax system and especially 
the effectiveness of tax collections. While it was possible to almost eliminate non-cash payments, 
there has not been an important success in the reduction of tax evasion and in solving related 
problems of corruption and transparent borders. Similarly, while some reforms on the expenditure 
side of the budget, especially elimination of privileges, increased the efficiency of expenditures and 
diminished arrears, lack of the right prioritisation remains the major weakness in utilisation of limited 
budgetary resources. Expenditures have to be increasingly focused on growth stimulating 
expenditures, i.e. on strengthening of juridical system and public order as well as on providing better 
quality primary health care and education services. It remains to be seen if the new territorial 
administration system will be conducive to this goal.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Some developments in the year 2000 have been seen as a breakthrough and a sign of the end of the 
economic crisis in Moldova. These developments included foremost the stabilisation of 
macroeconomic situation and the growth in the first half of 2000. Such optimism, however, is only 
partly justified. The macroeconomic stability is fragile and might be only temporary as heavy debt 
payments in next years would require even more disciplined financial policies and stronger export 
orientation of the economy. On the contrary, the growth in first half of 2000 has been driven 
exclusively by consumption with the subsequent surge in the non-energy and non-investment 
imports.  
Figure 12. Contributions to growth: H1 2000. 
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Exports did not exhibit any significant dynamics while exports to the non-CIS markets were 
actually diminishing. Dependence on non-reliable Russian markets is therefore increasing again. If 
the current level of privatisation proceeds is not maintained and used for investments rather than 
consumption, Moldova may face another balance of payment crisis soon.  
Our conclusion is therefore of only moderate optimism. Although real reforms undertaken in 
last two years by the Moldovan governments are conducive to growth, the critical mass has not been 
reached yet. The most important problems of lack of territorial integrity, ineffective legal system, 
widespread corruption and rent seeking have not been effectively tackled so far. Yet exactly these 
fundamental issues will determine the growth prospects of Moldova in the medium perspective. 
While virtually all structural reforms undertaken in years 1999 and 2000 were driven by pressures of 
IMF and World Bank28, the most fundamental problems can be solved only if the Moldovan 
parliament assumes the ownership and full responsibility for reforms and building up functioning 
market economy. 
                                                 
28 Most of described structural changes have been stipulated as structural conditions for disbursement of funds to 
Moldova. 
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